Who Ordered It

The Treasury’s notice of proposed rulemaking implements the COINS Act in the fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act and covers semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, high-performance computing, hypersonics and biotechnology, and the press release states no effective date.⁷ Four European operators, Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Telefónica and Vodafone, signed a letter of intent on 19 October to explore a joint bid for mobile satellite services spectrum in Europe. The satellite partner is still to be selected, no timeline is given and the operators say they would not invest directly in a satellite constellation.⁸

HUMAIN, DataVolt and Nebius signed a preliminary framework agreement, reported on 21 October, under which Nebius would take up to 50 megawatts (MW) at Oxagon in NEOM, Saudi Arabia. The 50 MW is half of the 100 MW initial phase, which is planned to reach 360 MW, and operations would be phased from the fourth quarter of 2027. No value is disclosed.⁹ In the oil market, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported on 21 October that distillate stocks rose by 1.68 million barrels to 104.3 million in the week ended 16 October, a level the Mitrade analysis places near the bottom of its 30-year seasonal range.¹⁰¹¹ Brent trades at a $13.70 premium to West Texas Intermediate (WTI), which settled at $99.47.¹¹

Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation authority said one person was killed and eight wounded in an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam on the evening of 21 October, without describing the weapon. Reports of drone debris at an oil field in south-east Saudi Arabia put the death toll there that day at one or two.¹³¹⁴ The State Department ordered non-emergency US government employees and their families out of Saudi Arabia, an ordered departure that spokesman Tommy Pigott said applies in Saudi Arabia only. US officials told Reuters that withdrawals of family members from several other regional missions were being planned.¹³ Reuters reported that the Houthis claimed attacks on 19 October on an Aramco site at Yanbu, on Shaybah and on the Riyadh and Abha airports, and Saudi Arabia said its crude production was unaffected while refined-product shipments were restricted.¹⁴¹¹ No report names a group responsible for the Dammam attack. The State Department describes the Houthis as Iranian-supported, and Saudi Arabia accuses Tehran of directing the campaign, which Iran denies.¹³ Aramco ordered staff to leave its Dhahran headquarters.¹⁵

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said on 22 October that seven oil tankers had been hit in the Strait of Hormuz, four while transferring oil and three after striking mines. It warned that the conflict would extend to US bases in the region if Washington helps tankers transit other parts of the strait. Al Jazeera notes that the claims could not be independently verified.¹⁶ Trump said Iran was making up fake hits to drive up the oil price before the midterm elections. An anonymous US Central Command spokesperson said the mine claims were incorrect, US forces had cleared the shipping lanes and 95% of vessels were getting through.¹⁶ The PortWatch count of 4 transits on 18 October against a baseline of 85 a day is described in §4, and the Central Command figure carries no stated date or denominator.¹² Analysts quoted by Nation Thailand cite talk of a possible US-Israeli strike on Iran after the midterm elections as a further source of risk premium.¹⁵ Issue 026 reported a $106.65 settlement on 12 October.

For operators and investors with Gulf exposure, the variables worth pricing are fuel cost, site access and cover. Sites that rely on diesel backup are exposed to higher delivered-fuel costs, depending on procurement terms and generator use. An ordered departure of US staff from Saudi Arabia can disrupt contractor schedules and staffing on projects in the Kingdom. The disputed accounts of tanker hits leave transit risk difficult to estimate. Owners of Gulf assets and construction projects may wish to review war and political-violence cover, evacuation provisions and fuel-indexed pricing clauses.

Russia fired 16 ballistic missiles and more than 200 drones overnight on 18 and 19 October, Zelensky said 28 substations and other critical energy facilities were struck, and at least 550,000 households lost power, with Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast targeted.² First Deputy Energy Minister Artem Nekrasov said energy infrastructure was hit in 11 oblasts and that Russia carried out 87 targeted attacks on the energy, oil and gas sectors in the past week.² Datagroup said a Kyiv data centre was destroyed and its equipment could not be restored, and that it continued serving customers from backup facilities.¹ Ukrainian drones struck the Petersburg Oil Terminal and the Ruchi oil depot on 18 October, and Russian authorities reported one person killed and 15 injured.¹ The unmanned systems battalion of Ukraine’s 71st Brigade posted a video on its unofficial Telegram channel on 17 October of a 140 kg munition dropped into an open gap where a gas pipeline runs and detonated with a drone. The video description calls it “routine maintenance” and says the exit from the pipe is blocked. The claim comes from the unit’s own post, names no pipeline or location and is not independently confirmed.¹⁷

Zelensky told senators on 19 October that Ukraine received no warning before the first ballistic wave and that Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth had not signed off on Patriot interceptors and air-defence missiles that NATO countries had already paid for.¹⁸ He said he had offered envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner a 30-day halt to refinery strikes in exchange for Patriot protection, and that they showed no openness to it.¹⁹ A US government official called the Patriot claim not true, Trump said Zelensky did not know what he was talking about, and a NATO official told the Kyiv Independent that deliveries through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) were continuing.¹⁸ Bloomberg reports that Trump faulted Ukraine for rising diesel costs and demanded it stop striking Russian refineries.²⁰

For operators and investors with assets in Ukraine or within reach of Russian long-range strikes, the exposure that determines outcomes is power autonomy and site separation. The 19 October strikes left at least 550,000 households without power and destroyed a Kyiv data centre. Datagroup’s continued service from backup facilities separates the loss of a site from the loss of service, and the open question is whether backup facilities share the same physical and power risks. Because the supply of air-defence interceptors is itself under negotiation, protection of a given city cannot be assumed, and sites in range may warrant underwriting for fuel autonomy, backup location and restoration times.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 20 October, citing three European officials familiar with US intelligence, that Putin ordered an escalation of sabotage against NATO countries. The report links the order to Russia’s limited battlefield gains, increasingly damaging Ukrainian strikes inside Russia and Kyiv’s refusal to accept Moscow’s terms, and says Western intelligence sees the 5 August Leipzig airfield incident as a possible test.²¹ One official said an informal Moscow contact had warned a European official that similar operations were likely, and the report says future operations would aim at physical disruption and at strengthening political movements opposed to military support for Ukraine.²¹ The account rests on anonymous officials and is not independently confirmed, and the United24 summary does not mention the Starlink incidents below.²¹ Vilmantas Vitkauskas, head of Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Centre, said an attempted arson at a Starlink base station on the outskirts of Vilnius at about 2am on 18 October was an act of sabotage. He linked it to earlier attacks on Starlink stations in Bulgaria and Poland and called it part of Russian attempts to disrupt Starlink. The fire was quickly extinguished, operations were not disrupted and no suspects have been named.²² Moscow says such accusations are baseless. Poland blamed Russia for a September fire at a Starlink facility that damaged its power system and backup generator and detained four suspects. Bulgarian authorities cited local media reports that fire was set to several Starlink antennas on 10 October.²²

On 22 October the UK government published a White Paper proposing up to 14 years in prison for intentionally damaging undersea telecoms and energy infrastructure and unlimited fines, including for reckless or negligent damage. It also proposes statutory security and resilience duties for subsea telecoms cable providers, ministerial powers to direct providers and repair capabilities, and a regime for fibre-optic sensing technology on subsea cables.²³ The consultation runs for 12 weeks and the proposals would replace laws described as 140 years old. The release says fibre-optic cables carry about 99% of UK international data and undersea pipelines about 74% of UK gas supply. It cites suspicious Russian activity, including a covert submarine operation exposed in April.²³ The Hamburg trial of Serhii Kuznietsov, a former Ukrainian army officer, over the Nord Stream blasts of 26 September 2022 opened on 14 October with 16 court dates set through 17 December.²⁴

For operators and investors, the small site that carries a critical function is the exposure to watch. The Vilnius and Polish incidents identify ground stations as targets, and the WSJ account separately suggests a wider campaign of physical disruption, so a single fire at a small site could interrupt a service. Owners of ground stations, base stations and landing stations may wish to review perimeter security, fire protection and spares, and owners of UK subsea systems could cost the proposed security duties and direction powers before the 12-week consultation closes.

Brian Hardesty, an adviser to the US delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, told the UN First Committee on 21 October that Kosmos-2612 exhibited threatening behaviour by intentionally manoeuvring dangerously close to a commercial satellite, and called the decision deliberately reckless.²⁵ ICEYE-X36 carries radar that images through cloud cover, and its operator signed a contract in January to provide intelligence to Ukraine’s Defence Ministry.²⁵ Some estimates put the approach at about 200 metres. LeoLabs, an aerospace intelligence company, said it was not a routine conjunction and was consistent with sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations. A Russian representative called the US claims absurd, and no damage or service interruption has been reported.²⁵ RFE/RL notes that the US Air Force Secretary, Troy Meink, said last month that the US has deployed on-orbit space control weapons.²⁵

The WSJ reported on 20 October that Musk ordered the slowdown of Starshield, SpaceX’s military version of Starlink, which began overnight on 13 and 14 October and hampered Ukrainian attack and interceptor drones, as Issue 026 reported from Ukrainian officials.²⁶²⁷ The restriction concerns the speed at which a moving terminal can stay connected, so it affects drones and other fast-moving platforms and leaves download speeds for ordinary users largely out of the picture. Zelensky said access remained degraded for systems travelling above 100 miles per hour (about 160 km/h).²⁸ Sources told the WSJ that Musk and Trump discussed the decision after the slowdown became public and, according to one source, also before it took effect. Some US officials said Musk acted on his own and Trump never specifically ordered it. The WSJ also reported that SpaceX asked the White House to agree a public account presenting the decision as coordinated.²⁶ Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 21 October that the administration had no foreknowledge and had not requested the slowdown. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said Washington had not withdrawn Ukraine’s access. Reuters separately reported that the order came from inside the White House.²⁶²⁷ On 22 October Senator Richard Blumenthal opened a congressional inquiry with letters to Hegseth and Musk, asking SpaceX for written answers by 5 November and a briefing by 12 November.²⁸ Nokia, ICEYE and Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence announced on 22 October a letter of intent to develop sovereign satellite-communications capability, with no funding or timetable stated.²⁹

For operators and investors, the question to price is who can change the service. According to Ukrainian officials, terminals on fast-moving platforms were restricted without warning overnight on 13 and 14 October, and SpaceX and the US government still give different accounts of who authorised it. Buyers of satellite connectivity on government or military terms may wish to read the clauses on who can change speed and usage limits, the notice required and the remedy. Operators of commercial satellites that serve defence customers could check whether insurance and contracts cover a close approach that causes no damage.

Ooredoo and Zain towers. On 22 October Ooredoo Group and Zain Group announced the first closing of their regional tower transaction, combining about 4,000 towers of Ooredoo Qatar and Zain Kuwait in a 50/50 platform. No value was disclosed, further tower portfolios are to be integrated progressively subject to closing conditions and approvals, and the two operators keep their active network infrastructure.³⁶ The companies agreed exclusive negotiations in July 2023 over an independent tower company of about 30,000 towers across six markets.³⁷

MViSTA submarine cable. Reuters reported on 22 October that the developers of MViSTA, a cable of about 2,500 km with 16 fibre pairs linking Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and Thailand, expect to pick NEC or Alcatel Submarine Networks as supplier later in October. Service is planned for late 2028. The developers put the cost at about $400m, say Chinese suppliers are excluded and say the route avoids waters claimed by Beijing in the South China Sea, and Mark Procter of Stavian High Tech Infrastructure is the named source. Backers include Stavian, Midas Capital of Tokyo and LitUp Network of Malaysia’s OMS Group, and Reuters describes the project as US-backed. No supplier contract has been awarded.³⁸

Scores are editorial assessments on a 0 to 100 scale, where higher means greater risk. A weekly change records this week’s evidence moving the assessment and does not correspond to a measured series.

• 01
  For satellite connectivity buyers on military-grade or government-controlled service: which party can change speed or usage limits, with what notice, and what remedy applies if a supplier’s owner imposes a limit that the government says it did not request?

  Starshield slowdown, Wall Street Journal via SAN, 21 Oct 2026; Reuters via Korea Times, 21 Oct 2026
• 02
  For operators of commercial satellites that serve defence customers: do insurance and contracts address a close approach by another satellite that causes no damage, and who bears the cost of any avoidance manoeuvre?

  ICEYE-X36 and Kosmos-2612, RFE/RL, 22 Oct 2026

• 03
  For ground stations, teleports and base stations that serve Ukraine or defence customers in Poland, the Baltic states and Bulgaria: what physical security, fire protection and site redundancy are in place after the Vilnius, Bulgarian and Polish incidents?

  Lithuania Starlink fire, Reuters via The Star, 18 Oct 2026
• 04
  For telecom and data-centre sites in regions hit by Russian strikes: how many hours of battery and generator autonomy and how much fuel are held against outages like the one affecting at least 550,000 households on 19 October?

  Kyiv Independent, 19 Oct 2026; Forbes, 19 Oct 2026

• 05
  For owners of UK landing stations and subsea cable systems: what would statutory security and resilience duties, ministerial direction powers and repair requirements cost, and would any of them conflict with existing contracts?

  UK subsea White Paper, GOV.UK, 22 Oct 2026
• 06
  For UK fibre positions: what conditions could the Culture Secretary attach after the CMA report on BT and TalkTalk of 19 October, and which remedies on nexfibre and Substantial would change the investment case?

  MLex, 19 Oct 2026; Capacity, 2 Oct 2026

• 07
  For platforms with power purchase agreements or fuel contracts exposed to oil and gas prices: which contracts index to Brent or gas, which pass price changes to customers, and have exposures to Russian-origin diesel been checked against the US licence and the EU and UK bans?

  Brent settlement, Nation Thailand, 22 Oct 2026; US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, 9 Oct 2026; Meduza, 21 Oct 2026

• Starshield and comparable service terms should be reviewed for who may change limits and on what notice, and the contractual position should be checked where a supplier’s owner and a government give conflicting accounts. The WSJ reports that Musk ordered the Starshield slowdown, and Rubio said the administration had no foreknowledge.
• Ground stations, base stations and data-centre sites serving defence customers or conflict-zone users could be reviewed for physical security, fire protection and backup power. Lithuania called the 18 October Starlink station fire sabotage, and Datagroup said a Kyiv data centre was destroyed on 19 October.
• Cover for Gulf airports, energy sites and construction projects could be reviewed for war and political-violence terms before the next escalation. Dammam airport was attacked on 21 October, and the US ordered non-emergency staff out of Saudi Arabia.

• Owners of UK subsea cable assets could scope the cost of the proposed security duties, direction powers and repair requirements and prepare a consultation response within the 12-week window. The UK White Paper of 22 October proposes statutory duties and up to 14 years in prison for damaging subsea infrastructure.
• Power and fuel procurement could be restructured where oil-indexed or gas-indexed terms leave costs exposed. Brent settled at $113.17 on 22 October, up from $106.65 on 12 October.

• Each portfolio asset’s dependence on third-party-controlled connectivity, orbital assets and conflict-exposed power could be assessed ahead of the next hold-or-exit decision. This week’s reports show decisions on service limits, orbital behaviour and grid damage being taken by parties other than the asset owner.